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I. Introduction
The U.S. health system has the health privacy system it deserves. It is
fragmented, based on regulatory technicalities rather than principle, and is
frequently exploited by rent-seekers. Suppose, however, the U.S. health
system evolved or was changed into a system designed not around
individualism (or individual choice) but solidarity. 1 Would that change
enable a recalibrated health privacy system? What could it look like, and
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1. Health solidarity argues that ill health is a social cost and therefore should be borne
by all through (typically) a universal system of care. Solidarity (or health equity) often is
viewed as oppositional to the American value of individualism See generally William M.
Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still American, in HASTINGS CTR., CONNECTING
AMERICAN VALUES WITH HEALTH REFORM 10 (Mary Crowley ed., 2009); Lindsay F. Wiley,
From Patient Rights to Health Justice, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016).
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would that somewhat relaxed health privacy system itself improve the
health system, thereby completing a virtuous circle?
At the outset, we emphasize that this Article is not a thinly veiled attempt
at reducing or removing health privacy protections. Health data, because of
their psychological and emotional implications, particular sensitivity, and
potential for enabling stigma and discrimination, deserve exceptional
protection. Rather, we posit a thought experiment, examining how health
care and health privacy could evolve together, benefiting both.
The core proposition that we advance is that there is (or should be) a
hydraulic relationship between healthcare and health privacy, that is as
healthcare access increases, the need for health privacy will decrease (and
vice versa). First, if health care continues to robustly prohibit health
discrimination and continues to grow closer to universal access, the need
for health data protection should decrease. This decrease would result not
because privacy declines as a value but because exposures of health
information would be less consequential. Second, it is broadly accepted that
the United States imprudently spends a considerably larger percentage of its
“health dollars” on clinical health rather than public health. The outsized
role of social determinants, zip-code health, and institutionalized health
inequities have been accentuated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Public
health recognizes solidarity (social and health interdependence) as a
fundamental tenet. As the recovery from COVID-19 begins and we “build
back better,”2 public health (and hence, solidarity) likely will be
strengthened. Third, the movements towards universal access and more
vibrant public health are likely to be premised on a shift away from health
individualism to solidarity. As this shift slowly develops, it is likely to
engender more sharing of personal information in order to improve the
overall health of the population.
In summary, the hydraulic relationship we posit is that if health care
continues to robustly prohibit health discrimination and continues to grow
closer to universal access, the need for health data protection should
decrease. We further suggest that this could be part of unlocking the puzzle
of clinical and public health being slowed by individualism holding sway
over solidarity; if the consequences of data exposure are reduced, this
should encourage further sharing of data and overall system improvement.

2. WHITE HOUSE, BUILD BACK BETTER (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/buildback-better/ (detailing President Biden’s three-part plan to rebuild the American economy
following the COVID-19 pandemic).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4

2021]

A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE

53

II. Relating Health Privacy to Health Care
Data laws impacting healthcare lack theoretical integration into the
broader space of U.S. healthcare law and policy. They may be taught in
health law classes but are often treated as outliers (“class, we may not reach
the end of the syllabus and be able to discuss HIPAA3”). While data laws
were given a seat with older, relationship-based health law such as tort
duties, they are not seen as a crucial part of the modern healthcare
regulatory system and are viewed only from a distance when healthcare
history and policy are discussed. However, in this Article, we argue that our
healthcare data laws have a closer relationship to the healthcare law
mothership than is often portrayed (and that is not necessarily a
compliment).
Both healthcare and healthcare data protection are essentially accidental
systems, in large part because policymakers committed “original sins” from
which the two systems have never recovered. 4
Our healthcare system is a public-private hybrid whose Frankensteinian
properties are exacerbated every day that passes without us pushing the
“pause” button and tackling foundational questions. As Abbe Gluck puts it,
“Congress should be debating . . . whether health care falls into the category
of goods that individuals should either acquire on their own or go without.
Instead, all of our modern political health debates are about changes on the
margins.”5
U.S. healthcare data laws suffer from a similar lack of intellectual focus.
Policymakers, from the President, to Congress, to the Supreme Court, punt
on the core issue of our privacy rights, and mouth platitudes about how
important privacy is, while skirmishing over minor issues 6 such as whether
your cable company must ask before it sells your browsing history. 7
3. HIPAA refers to the Privacy and Security Rules, 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164,
Subparts A, C and E made pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.)
4. Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data
Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 143, 149 (2017) [hereinafter Terry,
Regulatory Disruption]; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Structural Determinism Amplifying the
Opioid Crisis: It’s the Healthcare, Stupid!, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 315, 330 (2019).
5. Abbe Gluck, America Needs to Decide: Is Health Care Something We Owe Our
Citizens?, VOX (Mar. 18, 2017, 9:36 AM EDT), http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/
3/6/14826974/health-care-aca-philosophy-republican-obamacare (emphasis omitted).
6. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 168.
7. See Sarah Krouse & Patience Haggin, Internet Providers Look to Cash in on Your
Web Habits, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2019, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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A. Privatized Health Care and Underregulated Health Privacy
In the absence of fundamental or foundational principles to build on, our
data laws lack paths to develop ahead or in conjunction with growing
threats. Notwithstanding, some government actors have stepped up to the
plate. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights
(HHS-OCR) has been increasingly effective in enforcing the HIPAA
Security and Privacy rules.8 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
trained its sights on healthcare, 9 and as Daniel Solove and Woodrow
Hartzog concluded, the “FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is functionally
equivalent to a body of common law” and the “FTC’s privacy jurisprudence
is quite thick.”10 Admirable, yes, but such common-law case-by-case
analogues tend to be quite inefficient.
Worse, given the lack of political consensus regarding increased data
protection outside of conventional healthcare, our data protection becomes
more dependent on private actors and soft regulation—for example, app
stores policing mobile medical apps, or famously weak industry codes of
conduct. 11 Even those private actors are at war among themselves as the
recent spat between Facebook and Apple over the latter’s increased
transparency rules resulted in public rebukes from the former. 12
Mothership healthcare policymakers also are enamored of the private
sector. Lacking a big reset button, they rely on market approximating
policies trotted out as though the late Kenneth Arrow never spent time on
this planet.13 Rather than adopting a public option to private programs, they
facebook-knows-a-lot-about-you-so-does-your-internet-provider-11561627803 (discussing
privacy concerns about how companies use consumer data and why the FTC asked internetservice providers to explain their data-privacy policies).
8. Cf. Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 203.
9. See, e.g., MARKUS H. MEISER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC
ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2019).
10. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014).
11. See Casey Ross & Erin Brodwin, Hospitals Turn to Big Tech Companies to Store
and Analyze Their Data — Leaving Patients in the Dark on Privacy Protections, STAT (Mar.
12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/12/hospitals-big-tech-store-analyze-dataprivacy/.
12. See, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh, Nice Try, Facebook. iOS Changes Aren’t Bad for Small
Businesses, WIRED (Dec. 24, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/sorry-facebookios-changes-not-bad-for-small-businesses/ (discussing how Facebook criticized Apple’s iOS
14, which gave users the choice to ban data tracking and established a more protective dataprivacy policy, for allegedly being too unfair to small businesses).
13. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
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spend their days adding private options to public programs. 14 As if
Elizabethan poor laws-inspired drug-testing and work requirements are not
enough, they want our Medicaid populations to open health accounts and,
like Medicare recipients, “enjoy” the benefits of privately ordered managed
care.15
Although dwindling in their frequency, there are still claims that the
United States has “the best health care delivery system in the world.” 16
However, that proposition is exploded by basic comparisons with other
healthcare systems:17 first, on outright quality metrics, and second, even
more seriously when judged on cost-effectiveness based on expended
percentages of GDP.18 The flawed response to the pandemic and the
resulting exorbitant death rate in the United States have served as stark
reality checks that private health care entities lack incentives “to invest in
healthcare solidarity to achieve herd-based improvements to the health of
all.”19 Similarly, it has been fashionable to claim that U.S. data laws were
groundbreaking and ahead of other countries. If that was ever true, it was

53(5) THE AM. ECONOMIC REV. 53, 941–73 (1963), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812044. See
generally Steven Durlauf, Kenneth Arrow and the Golden Age of Economic Theory, VOXEU
(Apr. 8, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/ideas-kenneth-arrow.
14. See, e.g., Mark Miller, When Medicare Choices Get ‘Pretty Crazy,’ Many Seniors
Avert Their Eyes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/
business/medicare-advantage-retirement.html (discussing Medicare and how it has
undergone greater privatization since the 1990s, notably with Medicare Part D for
prescription drug coverage).
15. See generally Elizabeth Hinton et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed
Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10things-to-know-about-medicaid-managed-care/ (discussing state Medicaid programs). For a
more in-depth critique of Medicaid programs, Medicaid expansion under the Affordable
Care Act, and state work requirements for Medicaid programs, see Nicolas P. Terry,
Medicaid and Opioids: From Promising Present to Perilous Future, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 865,
867–78 (2020) [hereinafter Terry, Medicaid and Opioids].
16. See, e.g., “Face the Nation” Transcripts, July 1, 2012: Speaker Boehner, Senators
Schumer and Coburn, Governors Walker and O’Malley, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012, 2:55 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-july-1-2012-speaker-boehnersenators-schumer-and-coburn-governors-walker-and-omalley/.
17. See, e.g., Roosa Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global
Perspective, 2019: Higher Spending, Worse Outcomes?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 30,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-healthcare-global-perspective-2019.
18. Id.
19. Nicolas Terry, COVID-19 and Healthcare Lessons Already Learned, 7 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES, May 2020, at 10 [hereinafter Terry, Covid-19 Lessons].
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revealed as a myth when Warren and Brandeis’s foundational “The Right to
Privacy”20 wound up and down an intentional torts cul-de-sac.21
Privatization also leads to the corruption of privacy as bad actors use it to
create proprietary data silos, either to monetize the data directly or, in the
case of healthcare providers, to protect other networks from competing for
their patients.22 Policymakers have responded by disfavoring such
“information blocking” and favoring patient data liquidity.23 However,
there is still too much friction in the system. This friction is proving a major
impediment to increasing care coordination that depends on longitudinal
rather than episodic models of care. 24 Equally, broader incorporation of
socio-demographic data necessary to combat social determinants must see
health care privacy embracing public health models (that lean towards
solidarity) and require broad data access and sharing.

20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). This 1890 article was influenced, in part, by technological advances within the
second half of the nineteenth century, such as the camera. Brandeis and Warren identified
four types of harms that were based on the “right to be let alone” and recognized that
generally one’s private matters are to be protected from publication. See, e.g., Bruce E.
Boyden, Regulating at the End of Privacy, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 173, 226.
21. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 148 (“Today, the article’s ‘Right
to Privacy’ title plays better than its substance and, perversely, that title now exists merely as
a slogan inaccurately preserving the myth of strong U.S. data protection.”).
22. Privacy advocates have expressed concerns about private actors profiting off of and
selling individuals’ health data, more commonly known as “data mining.” See, e.g., Kirsten
Ostherr, Telehealth Overpromises During the Covid-19 Pandemic, STAT (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/19/telehealth-overpromises-during-the-covid-19pandemic/ (expressing concerns about big tech companies storing individuals’ health data).
Moreover, privacy concerns about data mining have become a bigger issue in recent years.
See, e.g., Melanie Evans, Hospitals Give Tech Giants Access to Detailed Medical Records,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hospitals-give-techgiants-access-to-detailed-medical-records-11579516200.
23. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 and other scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also
Information Blocking and the ONC Health IT Certification Program: Extension of
Compliance Dates and Timeframes in Response to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency,
85 Fed. Reg. 70064 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 170, 171).
24. See, e.g., Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support, and
Remove Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-ocr-hipaanprm.pdf (strengthening HIPAA patient access and improving information sharing for care
coordination and case management).
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B. Original Sins and Fragmentation
These accidental and incoherent systems were both the product of
“original sins.”25 Elisabeth Rosenthal argues that “[t]he very idea of health
insurance is in some ways the original sin that catalyzed the evolution of
today’s medical-industrial complex.”26 An even more likely candidate for
the original transgression was the insertion of the employer into the
provision of access to healthcare. Post-World War II, government price
controls and favorable Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings saw
participation in employer-provided plans rise sevenfold between 1940 and
1953, to eventually cover over sixty percent of the population. 27 What
should have happened thereafter was a transition to a national health
insurance model. What actually happened was a two-tier system of
healthcare access based on employment status. From 1965 to 2010,
politically charged government interventions followed, providing insurance
to increasingly narrow slices of the population based on the federal poverty
level, disability, age, and so on.28
The orthogonal data protection sin was the Privacy Act of 1974, 29 passed
in the aftermath of Watergate. A 1973 Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare advisory commission had recommended a comprehensive
privacy law. 30 Instead, Congress enacted privacy legislation to control only
the data collecting practices of the federal government. 31
Those original sins begat fragmentation. The United States barely has a
healthcare “system,” instead surviving on a stew featuring a little Bismarck,
25. Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 149. Likewise, Frank Pasquale calls the
“original sin” of American privacy law the failure to embrace a comprehensive rather than
piecemeal approach to data protection. See id. (citing Episode 7: Mark Rothstein, Big Data &
Health Research, Apple ResearchKit, White House Consumer Privacy Bill, WK. HEALTH L.
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://twihl.podbean.com/e/7-mark-rothstein-big-data-health-research-applereserachkit-white-house-consumer-privacy-bill/ [https://perma.cc/LQ48-W2RL]).
26. ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG
BUSINESS AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 14 (2017).
27. Alex Blumberg & Adam Davidson, Accidents of History Created U.S. Health
System, NPR (Oct. 22, 2009, 3:28 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=114045132.
28. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1708–19 (2018).
29. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a).
30. See generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73–94,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
31. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
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a dash of Beveridge, some Canada, and still too much sub-Saharan Africa. 32
Indeed, the most difficult task is cataloging the different types of
fragmentation; they include, for example, resource allocation (e.g., public
health versus clinical care, downstream to patients rather than upstream to
pre-patients), funding streams, insurance markets, lack of coordination in
patient care, and so on.33
U.S. data protection also exhibits chronic fragmentation. 34 A
comprehensive data protection law is multifaceted across both horizontal
and vertical dimensions. Horizontally, it should apply to all sectors of the
economy. Vertically, it should feature Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPs)35—like protective standards throughout the data lifecycle: creation
through destruction. Upstream protections should include data minimization
and context or purpose limitations on data collection. Downstream, where
data is processed and disclosed, the law should require (at the least) quality,
security, integrity, and confidentiality limitations. And, of course, data
subjects should be given access, correction, use, and erasure rights, while
data custodians should owe duties of accountability and breach
notification. 36
32. See generally INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS (Roosa Tikkanen
et al. eds., 2020).
33. See Terry, COVID-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 10–11 (discussing the United
States’ fragmented health care system and how it has impacted the response to the COVID19 pandemic).
34. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809) (imposing data protection requirements
on financial institutions); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x) (governing the collection and use
of information and its effects on consumers’ creditworthiness); Consumer Financial
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1955, 2005 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–5603) (providing authority to take action to prevent a
“covered person” from “committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or
practice”).
35. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) developed these core privacy principles or
FIPPS that include the following: “(1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3)
Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.” Terry,
Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 148 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE :
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998)).
36. Compare, for instance, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) which recognizes health data privacy as a fundamental right. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32.
Instead of governing data privacy based on how and where the information was received, the
GDPR favors strong personal data uniform protections. See id. There is a presumption
against data collection, and data can only be collected if one of six exceptions applies. 2016
O.J. (L 119) 36; see also Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TECH. L.
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In contrast to such an ideal, U.S. data laws lack both horizontal and
vertical comprehensive characteristics. On the horizontal axis, our data laws
are split by domain or sector, so healthcare has a different data law
compared to, say, financial services. 37 On the vertical axis, our data laws
almost exclusively favor downstream models, protecting some
dissemination but seldom inhibiting collection. 38
Of course, HIPAA is illustrative of both limitations; vertically, it applies
only to healthcare, and horizontally, it provides only downstream
protections (confidentiality, security, and breach notification).39 However,
HIPAA is at the root of more serious fragmentation because of its relatively
narrow application. Rather than applying to healthcare data generally, it
applies to an increasingly narrow group of data custodians, primarily
“covered entities.”40 If there was truth in advertising, the “HIPAA privacy
rule” would have been called “the doctor-hospital-health insurer”
confidentiality rule.41

REV. 229, 237 (2020) (discussing the European Union privacy-protection framework).
Another more comprehensive privacy model making waves is the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA). CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (2021). The CCPA
defines personal data more expansively than the European Union’s GDPR does. Compare id.
§ 1798.140(v)(1) (defining personal data as “information that identifies, relates to, describes,
is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household”), with 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (defining
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”).
Although controversial, the CCPA has sparked a debate at the state level. Some states, such
as Nevada, Maine, Virginia, and Colorado have passed their own data privacy laws in the
wake of the CCPA. See e.g., Kayvan Alikhani, California’s CCPA Triggers a Tsunami of
State-Level Data Privacy Laws, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:45 AM EST), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/02/20/californias-ccpa-triggers-a-tsunami-of-statelevel-data-privacy-laws/?sh=63cafde76cad.
37. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 150 (“[S]ectoral models
inevitably encourage differential levels of protection, and that more often promotes a race to
the bottom rather than to the top. Worse, high levels of protection can be characterized as
outliers and targeted for ‘reform.’”).
38. Nicolas P. Terry, Assessing the Thin Regulation of Consumer-Facing Health
Technologies, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 95 (2020).
39. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 155.
40. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103 (2020).
41. For a more in-depth discussion, see Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at
162. While the HITECH Act of 2009 expanded HIPAA’s reach to business associates, the
protection provided to health data remains relatively narrow. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 13401, 123 Stat. 226, 260 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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Self-evidently, data held by data custodians other than covered entities or
by the data subject lack HIPAA protection. This omission results in
problems as we seek to protect data held in or by mobile devices, 42 fitness
bands, big data brokers, the Internet of Things—and the list keeps
growing.43 Unfortunately, healthcare data protection exhibits far deeper
fragmentation than is caused by HIPAA’s narrow verticality. Even within
HIPAA things get complicated. For example, process notes taken by
psychotherapists are viewed as personal notes and the Privacy Rule
therefore likely exempts most from the rule’s patient access and healthcare
provider disclosure provisions.44 Meanwhile, there has been an increase in
use of personal data (that previously would not have been considered health
data) by some HIPAA covered entities, who now rely on “health plan
prediction models” based on consumer data such as “income, marital status,
and the number of cars owned, to predict emergency room usage and urgent
care needs.”45
Outside of HIPAA, there is even more health care data protection
fragmentation. For example, Title II of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) applies an upstream (collection)
data protection rule to certain genetic information. 46 Regulations
promulgated under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
police some employer wellness plans. 47 And (at least until recently) 48 the
Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations (often referred to by their
citation, “42 C.F.R. Part 2”) promulgated under the Drug Abuse Office and

42. See Resources for Mobile Health Apps Developers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/healthapps/index.html.
43. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 194; see also Mark A. Rothstein
et al., Unregulated Health Research Using Mobile Devices: Ethical Considerations and
Policy Recommendations, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 196 (2020).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2020); see also Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
privacy/laws-regulations/index.html.
45. Kirk J. Nahra, Healthcare in the National Privacy Law Debate, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_
esource/2019-2020/december-2019/healthcare-debate/ (citing Natasha Singer, When a
Health Plan Knows How You Shop, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/29/technology/when-a-health-plan-knows-how-you-shop.html [https://perma.
cc/HCP6-HGD8]) .
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(1).
47. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2020).
48. See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
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Treatment Act of 197249 applied, in addition to HIPAA, to federally
assisted programs that maintain alcohol and substance use patient records.
C. Uneasy Federalism
Our healthcare system and data protection rules share another trait, what
could be described as uneasy federalism, as neither our federal or state
governments fully agree as to either policy or implementation. The
healthcare federalism built on top of our federal system of government has
resulted in a dizzying array of actors, sources of finance, and
reimbursement models that have created different rules governing access,
benefits, out-of-pocket expenses, and so on for different segments of the
population.50 Both holdings in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius51 reflected how far the United States is from a national
healthcare system; the Court deemed the Commerce Clause unable to
sustain the individual mandate, while states’ rights prevailed and upset
Medicaid expansion.52 Once again, where Americans lived was likely to
determine their access to healthcare.53
Beyond constitutional restraints, the primary cause of this uneasy
federalism is that the federal government has little or no interest—or
apparent ability—to design or implement a health care system. 54 Its
competence begins and ends with financing the endeavors of others which,
in some cases, it also regulates. Those “others” are the states and frequently
rent-seeking private actors, including health insurers and large health care
providers. Medicare may be a national program but, while nationally
financed, it primarily depends on implementation by the private sector and
state regulators.55 Similarly, the majority of Medicaid funding comes from
49. Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3).
50. See Terry, Covid-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 3.
51. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
52. Id. at 588.
53. Terry, Covid-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 4; see also Rachel Garfield et al., The
Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gapuninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/.
54. See generally Nicolas Terry, From Health Policy to Stigma and Back Again: The
Feedback Loop Perpetuating the Opioids Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 785, 788 (discussing
the lack of a “coherent national health policy” to combat the opioid crisis in the United
States).
55. See Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does It Work and
What Are the Implications?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/
medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-how-does-it-work-and-what-are-the-implications/.
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the federal government, particularly in the case of Medicaid expansion’s
enhanced match. 56 Though some federal regulatory guardrails exist, it is the
states who, by contract with the federal government, design and implement
their plans (again, primarily using private actors). 57 Further, it is clear that
one national political party subscribes to the policy of reducing those who
benefit from Medicaid either by implementing work requirements or
forcing states to reduce access by moving the financing model to one of
block grants.58 As for claims from the right that the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) was a federal government takeover of health care, 59 the most that
should be conceded is that it was a dramatic expansion of federal health
insurance regulation. Tragically, COVID-19 illustrated that the federal
government’s disinterest in implementing a national clinical care strategy
extended to public health. From managing shortages of Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) and ventilators, to testing, and failing to implement a
workable plan for the vaccine roll-out, the federal government acted as
though the Tenth Amendment was simply a policy directive to avoid
meaningful cooperation. 60 For example, the federal government was unable
to replicate the early successes of vaccine development with a workable
plan for states to accomplish actual vaccinations. 61
Data protection fares no better. Doctrinally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule is
an example of cooperative federalism. 62 While it preempts, it also permits
federal law to defer to some state laws—in particular, those that offer more
stringent 63 protection for patient data.64 So, for example, one state’s privacy
56. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2001(a)(3)(B)(y), 124 Stat. 119, 272 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. ch. 157).
57. See Snyder & Rudowitz, supra note 55.
58. See, e.g., Terry, Medicaid and Opioids, supra note 15, at 882–83 (discussing how
fiscal conservatives have attempted to use a block-grant framework for Medicaid).
59. See Bill Keller, Five Obamacare Myths, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2012), https://www.
nytimes.com/2012/07/16/opinion/keller-five-obamacare-myths.html.
60. See generally PUB. L. HEALTH WATCH, ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19
(Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020).
61. See, e.g., Dan Diamond, The Crash Landing of ‘Operation Warp Speed’, POLITICO
(Jan. 17, 2021, 7:00 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/17/crash-landing-ofoperation-warp-speed-459892.
62. Under a cooperative federalism framework, there is an overlapping of
responsibilities between the federal and state governments. See Mary Hallock Morris,
Cooperative Federalism, CTR. FOR STUDY FEDERALISM, https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/
index.php/Cooperative_Federalism (last visited May 28, 2021).
63. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1)–(6) (2020).
64. See id. § 160.203. This generally occurs with three types of state laws: (1) laws that
grant individuals more privacy protections or rights to their health information; (2) laws
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law may require that a psychologist obtain a patient’s consent to disclose
medical records over and above HIPAA requirements. 65 Cooperative
federalism thus enables states to be innovative and to provide greater
privacy protections for persons with medical or psychological conditions
associated with social or economic impact. 66 But, because state privacy law
was developed haphazardly, and is subject to continual developments in
related areas (such as reporting requirements, licensure, and certification),
the partial preemptive framework of cooperative federalism is confusing,
burdensome, and costly for many stakeholders. 67
III. Healthcare and Healthcare Privacy Hydraulics
Both healthcare and healthcare data protection are flawed. Indeed, to an
extent, they deserve each other. Both have also been the subject of
voluminous but unrelated reform proposals. Suppose, however, that we use
a different lens through which healthcare and healthcare data protection are
seen, one in which they exist in more of a hydraulic relationship.
Specifically, we should consider whether, as healthcare protections
increase, healthcare data protection should become less stringent or vice
versa. The culmination of the former process would be the re-engineering
of the U.S. healthcare system as one rotating around solidarity rather than
individualism. If that process was ever completed, it could justifiably lead
to a recalibration of health data protection—a new model that concentrates
less on protecting individual slivers of personal data and more on enabling
responsible flows of health data. Subsequently, as the health data protection
system increasingly is re-purposed to improve the health system, it would
complete a virtuous circle.

creating reporting requirements, such as those for disease, injury, child abuse, or public
health surveillance; (3) laws that require health plans to report or provide access to
information for financial audits, program monitoring, or licensure or certification. See id. §
160.203(b)–(d). In addition, the HHS Secretary can grant a state’s request for nonpreemption for certain reasons, including where the Secretary finds the state law serves a
compelling need related to public health, safety, and welfare. See id. § 160.203(a)(1)–(2).
65. See Jennifer Daw Holloway, What Takes Precedence: HIPAA or State Law?, AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 3, 2003), https://www.apa.org/monitor/jan03/hipaa.
66. See Grace Ko, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 522 (2006).
67. Id. at 507–08; see also Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out–The Burdens and
Challenges of HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum
Necessary” Standard, and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 157
(2003).
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There are several logical ancillaries to this thought experiment, and some
are speculative or for some other reason difficult to establish. For example:
Is there evidence that healthcare data protection has inhibited clinical or
public health data collection and analysis; in other words, does solidaritybased public health pay a privacy “tax” for its data?
Equally, how could we validate or measure an increase in the level of
clinical and public health research to justify the removal of the privacy tax?
Would increased solidarity in clinical and public health create a societal
or policy environment whereby data subjects would be in favor of the
recalibration of healthcare data protection?
Is there a political route for the United States to establish clinical care
solidarity, meaning a scenario whereby not only would all persons have
access to healthcare (universalism) but also all cohorts would have access
to the same healthcare system without today’s segmentation based on
reimbursement, etc.?
Could sufficient trust in solidarity health be built using legal tools such
as antidiscrimination rules which render bad actors’ misuse of data less
consequential such that lower levels of data protection would be palatable?
If this thought experiment were to evolve into policy, then we would
need to grapple with each of these questions and more. As explained above,
however, we are far from the goals of this thought experiment. The U.S.
healthcare system and health privacy systems operate in separate domains
that have been subject to numerous, unsuccessful reform efforts, resulting
in both systems remaining fragmented, overly complex, and
underperforming. But all is not lost. Hiding in plain sight are several
examples of successful shifts or recalibrations toward solidarity principles.
These examples justify the hydraulic hypothesis and may help shine a light
on the path forward.
A. ACA, GINA, and Pre-Existing Conditions
The relationship between the ACA’s prohibitions of health
discrimination and GINA68 provides not an example of an actual hydraulic
relationship, but more of a “what could have been” scenario.
GINA utilizes two types of data protection to safeguard against
discrimination based on genetic test results. First, GINA prohibits
downstream point of use discrimination by health insurers (Title I)69 and

68. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
69. Id. §§ 101–106.
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employers (Title II). 70 Second, GINA prohibits the requiring or (in many
cases) acquiring of genetic information. 71 The latter is an example of
upstream (collection-centric) protection. 72 As Bradley Areheart and Jessica
Roberts note, by using an upstream model that prohibits the collection of
genetic data, GINA has acted “more as a protection against invasions of
privacy than as a protection against discrimination,”73 although in practice it
did both.
In contrast, the ACA works to improve clinical care and promote public
health by prohibiting health insurance discrimination based on health status,
essentially by outlawing medical underwriting. 74 The ACA has now
survived its third existential encounter with the Supreme Court 75 and
increasingly seems immune to serious challenges in either judicial or
political spheres. However, in the future, if the ACA was invalidated or
repealed, the revocation of the prohibition on medical underwriting would
be only one of the many tragedies for public health. While some limited
genetic data regarding genetic susceptibility may still be protected under
GINA, any evidence of “manifest disease” could subject individuals to
adverse employment actions, denial of coverage, or increased coverage
rates.76
Leaving aside that existential threat, the ACA has removed the ability for
individual market insurers to deny coverage to or overcharge77 the
54,000,000 non-elderly Americans with pre-existing conditions who would
find themselves uninsurable in the individual marketplace if they were laid
off and lost health benefits.78
70. Id. §§ 201–213.
71. See, e.g., id. § 101(b)(d)(1) (prohibiting, in general, health insurers from requiring,
requesting, or purchasing genetic information for purposes of underwriting); id. § 202(b)
(prohibiting, in general, employers from requiring, requesting, or purchasing genetic
information about an employee).
72. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 172.
73. Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of
Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 714 (2019).
74. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1 to -7.
75. See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
76. See Reed Abelson & Abby Goodnough, If the Supreme Court Ends Obamacare,
Here’s What It Would Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/
supreme-court-obamacare-case.html.
77. Id.
78. See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing Condition Prevalence for Individuals and
Families, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/preexisting-condition-prevalance-for-individuals-and-families/; Karen Pollitz, Pre-Existing
Conditions: What Are They and How Many People Have Them?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct.
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Suppose, however, the ACA and its prohibitions on health discrimination
had existed prior to the Human Genome Project. Would (in very general
terms) Title II of GINA still have been necessary? Simply stated, if the
benefits to insurers from having access to genetic data on which to base
their medical underwriting had not existed, would their incentives to
acquire such data have evaporated along with the necessity for genetic
privacy? There are other reasons why genetic data should be protected and,
no doubt, rent seekers such as big data brokers would have continued to
collect data to sell to customers other than health insurers. Notwithstanding,
the hydraulic point is theoretically valid; if health law and policy reduces
the likelihood of discriminatory or other worrying uses of health data, then
less health data protection may be possible. Equally, if discrimination is reenabled as it was during the Trump Administration’s recent assault of the
ACA’s section 1557 nondiscrimination protections,79 arguably additional
data protection would be necessary.
B. Public Health, HIPAA, and Waivers
The HIPAA Privacy Rule describes a relatively cozy relationship
between healthcare entities holding protected health information (PHI) and
federal, state, and tribal public health authorities (PHAs). 80 Covered entities
may disclose such information to those authorities 81 subject to the minimum
necessary standard.82 A 2020 HHS-OCR guidance further detailed how
Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), typically acting as business
associates, 83 may be used as conduits in such data transfers.84

1, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/pre-existing-conditions-what-are-they-and-howmany-people-have-them/.
79. See generally Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or
Activities, Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156) (significantly narrowing
the scope of section 1557 by limiting nondiscrimination protections to individuals
participating in health programs or activities receiving HHS funding, programs or activities
administered by HHS under Title I of the ACA, and health insurance marketplaces and
insurance plans participating in such marketplaces); see also Walker v. Azar, 480 F. Supp.
3d 417, 429–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (striking down some of the Trump Administration’s rules
removing antidiscrimination provisions made by the Obama Administration pursuant to
section 1557 of the ACA).
80. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–160.316 (2020); id. §§ 164.102–164.106; id. §§
164.500–164.534.
81. See id. § 164.512.
82. See id. § 164.514(d)(3).
83. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; see also id. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e), 164.532(d)–(e).
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The hydraulic nature of this relationship is illustrated by how the
relationship between public health and privacy is adjusted during
emergencies. In 2004, Congress provided the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) the authority to waive certain health regulatory
requirements during times of national emergency. 85 HHS, in turn, has
issued waivers during several emergencies, such as Hurricanes Katrina,
Harvey, Erma and Maria, and the 2017 California wildfires. 86 Indeed, the
recent HIPAA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposes a “good
faith belief” about an individual’s best interests in disclosing information
involving emergency scenarios, including substance use and the
pandemic. 87
Not surprisingly, therefore, in March 2020, and based on the current
rules, HHS-OCR issued a limited waiver of HIPAA sanctions and penalties
during the COVID-19 national emergency.88 This had the effect of waiving
sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with the following HIPAA
requirements: (1) to obtain a patient’s agreement to speak with family
members or friends involved in the patient’s care; (2) to honor a request to
opt-out of the facilities; (3) to distribute a notice of privacy practices; (4) to
request privacy restrictions; and (5) to request confidential
communications.89 This waiver, however, is limited to hospitals that have
instituted a disaster protocol for up to seventy-two hours so that hospitals
may focus on providing patient care during crises instead of being
inundated with privacy-related paperwork.90
84. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HIPAA, HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES,
DISCLOSURES OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PURPOSES 1–3
(Dec. 18, 2020).
85. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, § 9, 118 Stat. 835, 863–64
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
86. Emergency Situations: Preparedness, Planning and Response, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/index.html (last visited May 29, 2021).
87. See Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support, and Remove
Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement, supra note 24 (detailing
NPRM’s efforts to strengthen HIPAA patient access and improve information sharing for
care coordination and case management).
88. Waiver or Modification of Requirements Under Section 1135 of the Social Security
Act, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/section1135/Pages/covid19-13March20.aspx.
89. Id.
90. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COVID-19 & HIPAA BULLETIN :
LIMITED WAIVER OF HIPAA SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES DURING A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY 1 (Mar. 2020); see also Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy
AND
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In the weeks and months that followed, HHS-OCR issued additional
FAQs, guidance, and notifications of enforcement discretion to prioritize
information sharing (subject to the minimally necessary standard). 91 Those
provisions permitted providers to disclose PHI of those infected with or
exposed to COVID-19 to first responders and PHAs; 92 allowed the use of
certain, less secure communications platforms for telehealth; 93 permitted the
unauthorized use and disclosure of PHI by business associates for public
health activities; 94 allowed the participation of covered entities (such as
pharmacy chains) in community-based-testing sites (such as drive-through
testing stations);95 and permitted contacting former patients with regard to

Rule to Support, and Remove Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement,
supra note 24 (discussing paperwork burdens).
91. See HIPAA and COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: HEALTH INFO.
PRIVACY (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hipaacovid19/index.html; see also Stacey Tovino, Professor of Law, Univ. of Okla. Coll. of Law,
Address at the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture, Tradeoffs: Technology, Privacy, and
the Law (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/programs/childress-lecture.php
(discussing prioritization and subordination of privacy rights).
92. OCR Issues Guidance to Help Ensure First Responders and Others Receive
Protected Health Information About Individuals Exposed to COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/24/ocr-issuesguidance-to-help-ensure-first-responders-and-others-receive-protected-health-informationabout-individuals-exposed-to-covid-19.html.
93. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote
Communications During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/17/ocrannounces-notification-of-enforcement-discretion-for-telehealth-remote-communicationsduring-the-covid-19.html; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FAQS ON TELEHEALTH
AND HIPAA DURING THE COVID-19 NATIONWIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 4–5 (Mar.
2020) (clarifying that health care providers may use popular apps, such as FaceTime or
Skype, for telehealth appointments and patient communication while prohibiting the use of
public facing communication apps such as Facebook Live, Twitch, and TikTok).
94. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion to Allow Uses and
Disclosures of Protected Health Information by Business Associates for Public Health and
Health Oversight Activities During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/
2020/04/02/ocr-announces-notification-of-enforcement-discretion.html.
95. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Community-Based
Testing Sites During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/09/ocrannounces-notification-enforcement-discretion-community-based-testing-sites-during-covid19.html.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4

2021]

A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE

69

plasma donations.96 In January 2021, HHS-OCR announced enforcement
discretion for violations of the HIPAA Rules in connection with the goodfaith use of online or web-based scheduling applications for COVID-19
vaccinations.97
HHS-OCR fine-tuned these re-calibrations to emphasize that there are
some instances where the right to information sharing should be
subordinated to individual privacy, particularly when it came to media
access to patients’ PHI, which can invoke stigma and discrimination, and
even subject patients to scams from bad actors. 98
Overall, however, this area provides a clear example of the hydraulic
relationship between public health and data protection (privacy and
security). As public health needs increased during the pandemic, HHS-OCR
(minimally) recalibrated HIPAA rules in a slight shift away from health
individualism privacy and toward public health solidarity to improve the
overall health of the population.
C. Clinical Trials, The Common Rule-HIPAA Construct, and IRB Waivers
The public health consequences and economic concerns associated with
the pandemic have ignited a need for medical research to create safe and
effective treatments and vaccines. This imperative has illustrated the (often
false) dichotomy between safety (which tends to emphasize regulation) and
speedy access (which values innovation and individual choice) in moving
treatments and vaccines from bench to bedside. For instance, since the
beginning of the pandemic, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
been under intense pressure to approve 99—or at the very least make

96. OCR Issues Guidance on How Health Care Providers Can Contact Former COVID19 Patients About Blood and Plasma Donation Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (June 12, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/12/guidance-on-hipaaand-contacting-former-covid-19-patients-about-blood-and-plasma-donation.html.
97. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION REGARDING
ONLINE OR WEB-BASED SCHEDULING APPLICATIONS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF INDIVIDUAL
APPOINTMENTS FOR COVID-19 VACCINATION DURING THE COVID-19 NATIONWIDE PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY (Jan. 2021).
98. OCR Issues Guidance on Covered Health Care Providers and Restrictions on
Media Access to Protected Health Information About Individuals in Their Facilities, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 5, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/05/
ocr-issues-guidance-covered-health-care-poviders-restrictions-media-access-protectedhealth-information-individuals-facilities.html (clarifying restrictions on disclosures to the
media); see also Tovino, supra note 91.
99. Contrary to public opinion, the FDA has one of the fastest drug approval processes
in the world, with drugs in the United States largely getting approval before they reach that
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available100—investigational products for the prevention and treatment of
COVID-19, including the botched attempt with hydroxychloroquine. 101 To
what extent do hydraulic relationships operate in the arena of drug
development and approval?
Obviously, giving access to investigational products, usually pursuant to
an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) 102 is an example of a hydraulic

stage in either Europe or Canada. See Benjamin N. Rome & Jerry Avorn, Drug Evaluation
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2283 (2020).
100. Over the last few decades, the FDA has increased the amount of expedited approval
pathways, reformed its expanded access pathway, and allowed submission of real-world
evidence and earlier surrogate endpoints to satisfy safety and efficacy standards. See id. at
2283–84. Within the context of the pandemic, the FDA further implemented a special
emergency acceleration pathway for SARS-COV-2: Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration
Program (CTAP). See Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration Program (CTAP), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/coronavirus-Sars-Cov-2-drugs/coronavirus-treat
ment-acceleration-program-ctap (last visited May 29, 2021).
101. For example, political controversy ensued after the FDA granted (based on what
some argued was inappropriate political pressure) then later revoked an Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) that allowed for chloroquine phosphate and hydroxychloroquine
sulfate to be used to treat certain hospitalized patients. See Rome & Avorn, supra note 99, at
2283; see also Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Revokes Emergency Use
Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June
15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and. Data now shows that
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine are neither safe nor effective and can present fatal side
effects, primarily affecting the heart muscle, causing changes in electrical activity or causing
inflammation. See FDA Cautions Against Use of Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine for
COVID-19 Outside of the Hospital Setting or a Clinical Trial Due to Risk of Heart Rhythm
Problems, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety-and-availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-or-chloroquine-covid19-outside-hospital-setting-or. Indeed, a tragic consequence occurred after a couple in
Arizona attempted to self-medicate with chloroquine phosphate, a related chemical
compound that is used to treat fish for parasites, resulting in the death of the man. Kimberly
Hickok, Husband and Wife Poison Themselves Trying to Self-Medicate With Chloroquine,
LIVE SCI. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-chloroquine-selfmedication-kills-man.html.
102. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks,
Congress provided the FDA the ability to issue an EUA whereby investigational medical
products can be made available to patients in certain public health emergencies before the
rigorous premarket approval process is completed. See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-276, § 4, 118 Stat. 835, 853–59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.
gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/
emergency-use-authorization (last visited May 29, 2021).
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relationship, albeit one between public health and drug safety. 103 But EUAs
(and the entire FDA pre-market approval process for investigational
products) also depend upon obtaining comprehensive and accurate health
data from human subjects in the clinical trial process.104 To an extent,
therefore, the drug approval apparatus—and in particular the institutions
that balance data protection, research protocols, and drug approval—
operate as a hydraulic process.
As is well known, the many historic abuses conducted in the name of
medical research (including, but certainly not limited to, atrocities from the
Nazi medical experiments 105 and the horrific Tuskegee Syphilis study 106)
resulted in stronger research standards for human experimentation. In the
United States, the various research standards culminated in the “Common
Rule,”107 which, in part, requires that Investigational Review Boards (IRBs)
protect, to the extent possible, human subjects from risks associated with
medical research.108 IRBs review research proposals to make sure they

103. The FDA will only issue an EUA where it is “reasonable to believe” that a treatment
“may be effective” and the known benefits outweigh the risks. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED
AUTHORITIES 7–8 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/emergency-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities.
104. Outside the scope of this section are the additional complexities that exist when
considering data protection for data about or affecting health that is not subject to HIPAA
(but may be subject to other federal or state laws) because such data is held in or by mobile
devices, fitness bands, big data brokers, the Internet of Things, etc. See Terry, Regulatory
Disruption, supra note 4, at 179; Rothstein et al., supra note 43, at 196.
105. Allan Gaw, Beyond Consent: The Potential for Atrocity, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED.
175, 175 (2006).
106. Id.
107. The Common Rule is the name used for HHS’s Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects. The term “Common Rule” was derived from the fact that fifteen different federal
departments and agencies adopted nearly identical regulations to govern the protection of
human subjects. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’),
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulationsand-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html.
108. These horrific abuses did result in some stronger research standards, including the
National Research Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, and the Belmont
Report in 1979 that provided greater clarification on equitable policies for medical research,
The Belmont Report, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 18, 1979), https://www.
hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf. While the Belmont
Report served as inspiration for the Common Rule, none of these legal tools engendered
trust in medical research, particularly for people of color and vulnerable populations. Much
still needs to be done—from making sure that clinical trials are sufficiently diverse to

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

72

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:51

protect participants’ welfare and rights, and that the research conducted is
ethical. 109 While privacy and confidentiality are considered, they were not
initially the central focus of the Common Rule. HIPAA was designed to fill
in the gaps with additional privacy protections associated with the use and
disclosure of the research participants’ PHI. 110 Thus, the Privacy Rule111
allows covered entities to use PHI internally for research (regardless of
funding or whether FDA regulates the research) or to disclose to outside
researchers where certain circumstances or conditions are met. 112
Under the Privacy Rule, researchers generally must obtain a patient’s
authorization for the use and disclosure of PHI for research purposes.
However, the Privacy Rule provides flexibility for an IRB to waive or alter
the authorization requirement in some situations, thereby enabling a
covered entity to use or disclose PHI for research without a patient
authorization.113 In order to waive or alter the authorization requirement, an
verifying a just and equitable allocation of resources, such as vaccines and medications, for
populations hit hardest by the pandemic.
109. See Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/institutional-review-boards-frequently-asked-questions.
110. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL RECORD PRIVACY: ACCESS NEEDED FOR
HEALTH RESEARCH, BUT OVERSIGHT OF PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IS LIMITED 13, 16 (Feb. 1999)
(acknowledging that the Common Rule did not sufficiently address the issues of
confidentiality and privacy in research settings).
111. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, §
261, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021–31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.). The Privacy Rule has subsequently been amended pursuant to the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, § 105, 122 Stat. 881, 903–05
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the HITECH Act, Pub. L. 1115, §§ 13401–13411, 123 Stat. 226, 260–76 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). For most covered entities, compliance with the Privacy regulations was
required as of April 14, 2003. Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T HEATH & HUM. SERVS.
(Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/
enforcement-highlights/2014-april/index.html.
112. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2020) (detailing situations where PHI may be used or
disclosed without permission of individuals). Note that section 164.512(b)(iii)(A) enables
disclosure without authorization for adverse event reporting for clinical trial drug sponsors
or others under the jurisdiction of the FDA.
113. See id. § 164.512(i). Waivers or alteration may also be done by a Privacy Board.
However, even where the authorization requirement is altered or waived, the IRB has an
express responsibility to protect research participants from risks under 45 C.F.R. part 46
(HHS’s Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects) and 21 C.F.R parts 50 and 56
(FDA regulations on the Protection of Human Subjects). In addition, other federal and state
laws and regulations may impose other restrictions on the use of PHI that may not be waived
or altered by an IRB or Privacy Board.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4

2021]

A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE

73

IRB (or Privacy Board) must determine that the disclosure could not be
conducted without access to and use of the PHI or that the disclosure
involves no more than a minimal risk.114 So, for example, an IRB may
completely waive the authorization requirement where obtaining
authorization is either impracticable or impossible, such as in the case
where multiple research participants’ contact information is unknown. 115
Likewise, an IRB can also partially waive the authorization requirement in
a situation where a researcher needs to obtain PHI to contact and recruit
potential research subjects.116 An IRB may also alter the authorization
requirement by eliminating a required element, such as the requirement to
describe the purpose of the requested use or disclosure. 117
In addition to the dynamic calibration that comes from placing IRBs at
the center of privacy-safety-research relationships, some more conventional
hydraulics can also be identified. For example, the FDA issued a guidance
in March 2020 permitting researchers to follow patients through the use of
less secure telehealth platforms, as opposed to onsite testing. 118 These
virtual platforms ensured that clinical trials could continue at a robust clip
during the pandemic and continue to generate useful data.119
The relationship between the Common Rule and the Privacy Rule
acknowledges that, although safeguards need to be provided to protect the
privacy and confidentiality of PHI, when it comes to medical research,
“[health data] is most useful when shared.”120 The Common Rule-Privacy
114. See id. § 164.512(i)(2). Minimal risk requires, at least, the presence of an adequate
plan (1) to protect PHI identifiers from improper use and disclosure; (2) to destroy those
identifiers at the earliest opportunity, unless otherwise required by law; and (3) adequate
written assurances that the PHI will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity
except required, authorized, or otherwise permitted. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(1)–(3).
115. Institutional Review Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (July 8, 2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/
irbandprivacyrule.asp.
116. Id.
117. See Clinical Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (June 22, 2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/clin_
research.asp.
118. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CONDUCT
OF CLINICAL TRIALS OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS DURING COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY : GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS 14–15 (Mar. 2020).
119. See id.
120. Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect Privacy of Health Information
While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 2082, 2082–83
(2010).
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Rule construct thus is a recalibration, with health research given
preferential treatment vis-à-vis privacy. And, by design, IRBs may finetune this calibration in favor of research goals.
D. Substance Use Confidentiality and the CARES Act
As already noted with regard to the ACA and its prohibition of medical
underwriting, privacy rules and antidiscrimination rules are capable of a
powerful hydraulic relationship, suggesting that increasing the latter could
justify reducing the former. This relationship is powerfully (if somewhat
controversially) illustrated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act’s 121 reform of The Confidentiality of Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Patient Records regulations (commonly known as Part 2).122
In addition to HIPAA Privacy, Part 2 provides a layer of confidentiality
to the identity and records of Substance Abuse Disorder (SUD) patients. It
applies to federally assisted programs that diagnose, treat, or refer SUD
patients.123 However, that can include personnel or a unit within a general
medical facility. Part 2 requires a detailed consent in writing from the
patient for any sharing of records. 124 The reason for the sharing and the
identity of the recipient must be identified with specificity. In most cases
redisclosure is prohibited, and the rules also impose limitations on how the
recipient of the information can use and disclose the information. 125
Dating from the 1970s, Part 2 was enacted before any modern federal or
state health data protections 126 and is part of the history of segregated
treatment of those with mental health or substance use needs. Part 2
survived the passage of HIPAA and remains as an additional level of
protection for substance use records. However, as substance use treatment
became more mainstream and providers relied more on electronic health
records (EHRs), Part 2 increasingly became controversial. Specifically, the
121. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). See generally Nicolas Terry, Melissa Goldstein & Kirk Nahra,
COVID-19: Substance Use Disorder, Privacy, and the CARES Act, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(June 8, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200605.571907/full/.
122. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1–2.4 (2020); id. §§ 2.11–2.23; id. §§ 2.31–2.35; id. §§ 2.51–2.53;
id. §§ 2.61–2.67.
123. Id. §§ 2.12(a)(1)(ii), (b).
124. See id. § 2.13.
125. See Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us/who-weare/laws-regulations/confidentiality-regulations-faqs.
126. Dennis McCarty et al., The Perceived Impact of 42 CFR Part 2 on Coordination
and Integration of Care: A Qualitative Analysis, 68 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 245, 245 (2017).
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dual regimes caused headaches for providers’ workflows while a frequent
inability to add SUD records to an EHR hampered emergency department
assessment, coordinated care, HIE data sharing, and SUD research based on
EHR data.127 Countering these arguments have been very real concerns
about the sensitivity of SUD records and the history of discrimination
against SUD patients.128
In recent years, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) has updated Part 2 but resisted efforts to
integrate it more fully with HIPAA, in large part because of limitations in
the enabling statute.129 In 2019, HHS published a draft framework for a
more fundamental reworking of Part 2.130 In July 2020, in what will
probably be the final revision of the “old” Part 2, the rule was revised to
“facilitate better coordination of care in response to the opioid epidemic
while maintaining its confidentiality protections against unauthorized
disclosure and use.”131
By then, the future of Part 2 had already been written by the major
changes introduced in March 2020 by CARES. Fundamental changes to
Part 2’s enabling legislation will lead to fundamental changes to Part 2’s
use and disclosure rules because they are aligned with the HIPAA
standards. Indeed, after an initial, less rigorous consent to use and
disclosure rules, the HIPAA rules will govern. HIPAA’s breach notification
rule has also been extended to substance use records. 132

127. See id. at 247–48 (discussing a group of state healthcare providers’ concerns about
operating under both HIPAA and Part 2).
128. See, e.g., Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg.
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The disclosure of records of
individuals with substance use disorders has the potential to lead to a host of negative
consequences, including: Loss of employment, loss of housing, loss of child custody,
discrimination by medical professionals and insurers, arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration.”).
129. See, e.g., id. at 6060–61; see also Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient
Records, 83 Fed. Reg. 239, 240 (Jan. 3, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).
130. HHS 42 CFR Part 2 Proposed Rule Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/08/22/hhs-42-cfr-part-2-proposedrule-fact-sheet.html.
131. Fact Sheet: SAMHSA 42 CFR Part 2 Revised Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (July 13, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/07/13/fact-sheet-samhsa-42cfr-part-2-revised-rule.html; see Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records,
85 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42986–87 (July 15, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).
132. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 3221(h), 134 Stat. 281, 378 (2020).
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The ADA recognizes substance use as a qualifying disability. 133
However, its qualification regarding unlawful use134 has been at least one
reason why Part 2’s more fervent supporters have viewed it as an
inadequate antidiscrimination provision. In contrast, the CARES Act
includes robust antidiscrimination provisions in an apparent attempt to
balance out the privacy changes.135 These provisions prohibit discrimination
“on the basis of information received . . . pursuant to an inadvertent or
intentional disclosure of records, or information contained in [substance
use] records.”136 The discrimination is prohibited in several domains,
including healthcare, employment, housing, the courts, and social
services.137
Needless to say, there are several variables in play here. The changes to
Part 2 will require as yet unwritten regulations, while the true worth of the
antidiscrimination provisions likely will depend on investigation and
enforcement. Only when those pictures become clearer will we know
whether the new relationship between substance use data protection and
healthcare discrimination has been successfully recalibrated.
IV. Conclusion
This thought experiment had modest goals. We wanted to critically
examine the existing relationship between the U.S. healthcare system and
our health privacy system and reimagine how these systems may function if
they were designed around principles of solidarity, rather than health
individualism. As stated earlier, this is not an attempt to eliminate
healthcare data protections. Health data are sensitive in nature and deserve
exceptional protection because of their potential for enabling stigma and
discrimination. Privacy protections have an intrinsic value in our existing
healthcare system because they promote trust, which leads to information
sharing and better health outcomes. But, like taxes, enhanced privacy
protections are burdensome, costly, and can hinder medical innovation. We
provided some examples of where laws, regulations, and practices were
successfully calibrated to shed light on how a careful shift toward solidarity
principles can create a hydraulic relationship between healthcare and health
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
134. An individual that is “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” is not a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. § 12114(a).
135. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act § 3221(g).
136. Id. § 3221(g)(i)(1).
137. Id.
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privacy, which would encourage information sharing in a way that benefits
both clinical and public health.
First, if our healthcare system evolves toward universal access and
continues prohibiting health discrimination, such with the ACA’s protection
of preexisting conditions, GINA, and the CARES Act’s robust
antidiscrimination protections regarding substance abuse information, then
the need for health data protection may decrease because exposure would
become less consequential.
Second, the pandemic has magnified many ugly truths about our
healthcare system, including how emphasis on clinical health over public
health has resulted in the outsized role of social determinants, zip-code
health, and institutionalized health inequities. Much work needs to be done.
However, strengthening avenues for information sharing that prioritize
communication and information sharing (particularly as it relates to public
health), such as regulations and guidance by HHS, OCR, and even the FDA
during the pandemic is a good start. Likewise, changes to Part 2’s use and
disclosure rules (although awaiting enabling legislation) to better coordinate
care, and the flexibility given to IRB (or a Privacy Board) to waive
authorization in certain circumstances are minimal, yet successful
recalibrations, the underlying premise of which could be replicated in other
areas of healthcare.
And finally, when we have an opportunity to look back at the pandemic’s
unnecessary death toll and begin the difficult task of rebuilding better,
perhaps we can adopt a unified approach—one which considers our
healthcare system in tandem with our health privacy system, and envisions
how, if recalibrated in a manner that favors solidarity principles, each
system could complement and improve each other, thereby completing a
virtuous circle.
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